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Abstract
Climate ethics have been concerned with polluter pays, beneficiary pays and ability to pay
principles, all of which consider climate change as a single negative externality. This paper
considers it as a constellation of externalities, positive and negative, with different
associated demands of justice. This is important because explicitly considering positive
externalities has not to our knowledge been done in the climate ethics literature.
Specifically, it is argued that those who enjoy passive gains from climate change owe
gains not to the net losers, but to the emitters, just as the emitters owe compensation
to the net losers for the negative externality. This is defended by appeal to theoretical
virtues and to the social benefits of generating positive externalities, even when those
positive externalities are coupled with far greater negative externalities. We call this the
Polluter Pays, Then Receives (‘PPTR', or ‘Peter') Principle.
Keywords: climate change; climate justice; carbon tax; polluter pays principle; externality
1. Introduction
It is clear by now that human activity is responsible for climate change (IPCC
2014: SPM 1). The global rise in temperature, but also the increase in its
variability, is already disrupting the living conditions of the current world
population. This takes the form of reduced health (rise in respiratory illnesses
and infectious diseases) (Watts et al. 2018); reduced safety (from extreme
weather events); and reduced ecosystem services (more impact on storm
buffers) (Nelson et al. 2013), to take only the anthropocentric view.1 The
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1A recent survey of the morally relevant assumptions that go into calculating the cost of these damages
was conducted by Fleurbaey et al. (2019).
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impacts on non-human animals and potential intrinsic natural value would have
to be added to this list. By all accounts, the worst is yet to come (cf. Mechler et al.
2019, for discussion of impacts beyond our ability to adapt).
In addition, climate harm is unevenly distributed. But what makes the climate
problem even worse from the perspective of justice is that the uneven distribution
of harm is all but unrelated to the distribution of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
that are responsible for it (Shue 1993, 2015). This has spurred a large literature on
climate justice that has mobilized scholars from several disciplines, including
philosophers (Gardiner 2004; Caney 2005; Gosseries and Meyer 2009; Gardiner
2011; Broome 2012; Meyer and Roser 2012; Kelleher 2017; Wallimann-Helmer
et al. 2018) and economists (Billette de Villemeur and Leroux 2011; Fleurbaey
and Zuber 2014; Dennig et al. 2015; Godard 2017).
While determining how to handle the plight of the victims of climate change is
definitely a crucial issue, a complete treatment of the matter of climate justice
must also explicitly account for the fact that there is growing evidence that some
end up benefiting overall from the changing climate. This is at least the case over
medium timescales, even in a context of increased emissions. By ignoring these
benefits, we both open the possibility that a certain class of climate sceptic will
think that theorists deny the heterogeneity of climate change and fail to recognize
the theoretical complexity and interest that a full account of climate justice would
require.2 Moreover, by considering these issues, and regardless of the practicality
of the transfers we shall end up recommending, we introduce new arguments to
guide political negotiations.3
Positive externalities are much smaller than the negative externalities from
climate change, but their relative size is not a reason to ignore them. By
(positive or negative) externality, we adopt the standard definition: (beneficial
or harmful) effects of permissible actions on third parties that are themselves
unable to affect (e.g. prevent) the actions. If emitters are to compensate those
who have been harmed as a by-product of emissions, it seems fair to
acknowledge the (more limited) benefits generated as by-products of the same
emissions. Again, such beneficiaries are definitely the minority, mainly located
in cold areas where growing seasons are short and where heating needs are
high, but they exist (section 2). The claims in this essay are general enough to
apply at any level but, for simplicity and concreteness, we primarily consider
relevant winners at the national (potential winners include Canada, Russia and
the UK, although it remains an open question whether any country as a whole
is a net climate winner) and sectoral levels (potential sectoral winners in
certain countries include agriculture, ocean transport and tourism).
2Rahmstorf (2004) calls those who underscore the possible positive consequences ‘impact sceptics’ and
Poortinga et al. (2011: 1021) found this type of scepticism ‘far more prevalent’ than other types. By carefully
discussing the limited and comparatively small positive climate effects, we may be able to take energy away
from this kind of scepticism.
3Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this pragmatic consideration.
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Because many individuals benefit from GHG emissions, directly or indirectly, it
is important to make clear whom exactly we mean by ‘net climate winners’.4 Indeed,
while we use this typology for net climate winners, we believe this to be helpful for
many areas of theorizing about beneficiaries, and hope that it opens up new
dialectical space in discussions of beneficiaries.5 We identify four categories of
benefits from GHG emissions:
1. The benefits from emitting GHGs, which emitters enjoy by externalizing the
social cost of emissions. In fact it is the very reason why there are excessive
emissions in the first place. We shall give emitters the moral standing of
polluters because they are at the origin of the climate problem.
2. The indirect benefits from this cost externalization, enjoyed through bequests
(by the heirs of emitters) or through being part of a firm that polluted under
previous management. Although the beneficiaries are not themselves the
emitters, it is possible to trace back their gains to the initial externalization
of costs. As such, we argue that those gains should be considered in the
same way as those of the emitters themselves.6
3. ‘Passive gains’, which are the gains one would obtain by pursuing the same
policies despite the changed climate and economic environment; i.e., by not
adapting their course of action. ‘Passive net winners’, the associated
beneficiaries, can be those who gain merely through changes in supply or
demand (e.g. extant air conditioner producers who benefit from the surge
of demand associated with heatwaves) or whose production functions
improve under climate change but not through any active policy (e.g.
extant wine growers who find their grapes grow better or more cheaply).
Note that passive gains are ‘virtual’: they are what would be gained if the
beneficiary had not changed its practices.7
4Note that the relevant externalities need not be limited just to goods that are priced in markets. For
instance, biodiversity losses may not be priced in markets (putting aside contingent valuation methods),
but we could take the externalized costs of climate change to be some species damage at a value that
reflects the resources needed to mitigate the harm. In particular, given a species harmed by negative
externalities, we could take the damage to be the cost of helping save that species, e.g. the cost of
setting aside a nature preserve and protecting the species.
5We happily agree with an anonymous reviewer that there is this broader applicability, which could also
be applicable beyond climate contexts.
6The argument for this subsumption is as follows: on standard Polluter Pays Principle views, group agents
can be held morally liable for pollution, and those group agents include individuals who have little or no
decision-making power. For instance, the administrative assistant in an oil production facility benefits when
the oil is sold and suffers if the facility is forced to transfer resources away, and we think this can be
appropriate even when that assistant had no relevant decision-making capacity within the facility.
Similar claims can be made when holding countries to be the polluters in terms of PPP, and carbon
debts disadvantage taxpayers who had no control over national emissions strategies. If this is accepted,
we believe a parallel case can be made that those who inherit gains from emissions as being subject to
the same debts incurred by the initial externalization.
7Virtual costs or benefits are nothing new in economics, the most famous of which is undoubtedly the
opportunity cost. It is defined as the value of the best alternative use of resources; i.e. the highest gain one
would have obtained had they used their resources differently. The opportunity cost is generally used as a
baseline to evaluate profitability, just like we shall use passive gains as a baseline above which to compute the
next category of gains (i.e. ‘active gains’).
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4. Finally, in contrast to passive gains, are ‘active gains’, which are the benefits from
changing one’s course of action in response to climate change (e.g. by entering or
exiting markets to seek new business opportunities). Examples of beneficiaries
include firms that provide innovative adaptation solutions to counteract the
negative impacts of a changing climate, or even individuals who take action
to secure possible productivity gains brought about by a more hospitable
climate in some areas (e.g. winemakers who develop businesses growing
grapes where the terroir had been inhospitable before climate change).
These are the gains enjoyed over and on top of the passive gains. We shall
refer to the related beneficiaries as ‘active net winners’.8
To sum up roughly and to fix ideas for the rest of the article, we shall treat type-1
and type-2 beneficiaries as ‘the polluters’; type-3 benefits are lucky gains, while type-
4 gains are deserved gains.
We can draw these distinctions formally: denote by C and C 0 the old and new cli-
mates, respectively, and by a and a0 the actions taken by a decision-maker under the old
and new climate, respectively. Finally, denote by π the profitability of a given action in a
given climate. An agent (an individual, or firm, or country, etc.) is a net winner if
πa0;C0  πa;C > 0. This net gain can be decomposed into two parts:
πa0;C0  πa;C  πa0;C0  πa;C0  πa;C0  πa;C . The (counterfac-
tual) bracketed gain, πa;C0  πa;C, corresponds to the agent’s passive/lucky gains
whereas the gains πa0;C0  πa;C0 represent the active/deserved gains.
Note that these categories of net winners are not mutually exclusive. For example,
a farmer who is an heir to the fortune of an oil producer, whose fields have become
more productive, and who has decided to switch to crops that are more suited to the
new climate enjoys benefits of types 2, 3 and 4, simultaneously.9
What of these ‘passive net winners’? Should they be left to enjoy the gains from
the benefits brought about by a warmer climate even though they have no – or very
little – responsibility for these changes and although climate change causes severe
harm to many (section 3)? Or does this passive betterment imbue them with a duty
towards the rest of society? We argue for the novel claim that active net winners are
entitled to their gains whereas passive winners are not: the latter owe their gains –
and not to the net losers, but to the emitters, in light of the positive externalities the
emitters generate. We argue that these transfers are warranted provided that
the emitters have compensated the net losers for the negative externalities they
created.
As far as we know, the literature does not grapple with this issue. Although
related, it is distinct from the more familiar question about who should bear the
8This is merely a shorthand term because active net winners also enjoy passive gains, the latter being
virtual.
9Here is a numerical example. Suppose the farmer has inherited $50k from the oil-producing activity of a
relative. Suppose the increase in land productivity due to the new climate using the same crops and the same
agricultural practices corresponds to a gain of $10k/year. Finally, suppose that the farmer has changed to
crops better-suited to the new climate that now yield profits $25k/year higher than with the old crops prior
to climate change. This farmer enjoys indirect benefits (type 2) from emissions to the tune of $50k, passive
gains (type 3) of $10k/year, and active gains (type 4) of $15k/year, the latter corresponding to the differential
between the total net gains from farming and the passive gains.
4 Kian Mintz-Woo and Justin Leroux
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267120000449
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University College Cork, on 23 Feb 2021 at 09:19:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
burdens and costs of climate change simpliciter (Caney 2005; Page 2008; Atkins
2018), where common answers point to the polluters10 (polluter pays principle,
PPP) (Gardiner 2004), to the beneficiaries11 (beneficiary pays principle, BPP)
(Meyer 2013; Butt 2014; Goodin and Barry 2014; Page and Pasternak 2014), and
to those who have sufficient resources (ability to pay principle, APP) (Caney
2010). Our view differs significantly from these traditional climate justice
principles. While those who defend PPP endorse our conclusions about the first
category (and sometimes the second), the other categories are not part of this
familiar view. While parts of our theory might appear similar to BPP (e.g. with
respect to the second, third and fourth categories), there are two important
points of divergence: (1) BPP theorists think the flows should go from the net
winners to the net losers, not to the emitters, and (2) they do not make the
distinction we do between active and passive net winners, something which will
be integral to our view. Finally, this also differs from APP, since we are claiming
that some should pay in light of their historical connection to externalities. In
contrast to PPP, BPP and APP, we could call this view the PPTR (pronounced
‘Peter’) Principle, for ‘Polluter Pays, Then Receives’.
Our concern is twofold: to incentivize efficient behaviour and to ensure the
reparation of harm. PPP focuses on incentives and in reparation of harm (unless
we are taking a simple Pigouvian interpretation), but it cannot handle cases of
mixed externalities (some positive, some negative). By contrast, BPP focuses on
reparation of harm, but is blind to incentives. Our PPTR principle allows for
systematically addressing efficiency and reparation – with the latter being given
priority – in settings with any permutation of externalities. It is not merely a
convex combination of PPP and BPP since no combination of these principles
justifies transfers from winners to emitters.
We then examine to whom this indebtedness should be directed (section 4). It
may seem intuitive to ask of net winners to come to the aid of those that are harmed
by the changing climate, whether current or future generations. But arriving at this
conclusion requires first dealing with the asymmetry that this could entail: if the
bulk of the climate justice literature views GHG emitters as responsible for
climate harm and, therefore, liable to compensate climate sufferers, why should
net winners not be symmetrically indebted towards GHG emitters, to the point
of possibly rewarding them for the ‘better’ climate (in the eyes of net winners)?
We defend the view that the symmetry between gains and losses should be
respected, with the implication that net winners are indebted to emitters, rather
than to climate losers. Indeed, from the point of view of society, the emissions
are the source of negative externalities but also of positive externalities. Hence,
compensating the harmed is not the only relevant compensation: both ‘passive’
10We take the polluters referred to in the PPP literature to be those corresponding to our first category of
gains, those gained from externalizing the social cost of emissions.
11We take the beneficiaries referred to in the BPP literature to be those corresponding to our second, third
and fourth categories of gains. However, as BPP is often motivated by concerns of complicity, and our
externality-based concerns are orthogonal to complicity, there might be differences here. Thanks to
Avia Pasternak for conversation on this point. Along with one of our reviewers, she suggested that our
arguments might support revisions or extensions to BPP instead of a rejection of it. We hope to take
up this question in future work.
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net winners (those who passively gain from climate change) and net losers (those
subject to net negative externalities) are morally required to compensate and receive
compensation from emitters, respectively. Nevertheless, outside of the ideal case
where emitters are willing and able to compensate net climate losers, we suggest
relying on what we call a ‘hierarchy of claims’, which holds that compensating
the harmed is of foremost importance. The implication is that, in non-ideal
cases, (passive) net winners should compensate climate victims instead of
rewarding emitters. Indeed, the hierarchy we propose also manifests itself among
climate winners: we claim that what we call ‘active’ winners are entitled to their
gains whereas ‘passive’ winners are not.
We then illustrate the implications of the view in a particular context, the
Canadian federal system (section 5), where we examine two possible levels of
application: by sectors of the economy (agriculture, tourism, etc.), or by province.
Finally, we conclude by arguing that this approach to net winners goes beyond
the traditional three principles – PPP, BPP and APP – by drawing attention to the
heterogeneous externalities involved in climate change (section 6).
2. Net winners exist
Mounting evidence suggests that some countries are experiencing gains from a
changing climate to warmer temperatures or, at the very least, that this is true of
some sectors of those countries over medium timescales. These countries are
generally the ones with colder climates, such as Canada, Russia and the UK.
While this evidence is meant to motivate the project, we are not committed to
any of these particular actors actually being net winners. We wish to consider
the normative situation where there are net winners, whosoever they ultimately are.
An alternative way of saying the same thing is that our claims are conditional on
there being net winners from climate change. However, climate change itself is of
course unnecessary to generate the kind of problem that we are concerned with in
this paper. In general, all that is needed is (a) an agent, who acts or enacts policies
which (b) generate positive and negative externalities. We can narrow the range of
problems down further to those, like climate change, where the negative externalities
are far larger in magnitude than the positive externalities, but that is not necessary. In
short, the claims in this paper are conditional on a problem satisfying these two
conditions, which we believe are satisfied in the case of climate change.
First, we provide evidence for the existence of net winners of the morally relevant
type (subsection 2.1). Next, we offer both a couple of clarifications and some guiding
intuitions behind our project (subsection 2.2).
2.1. Evidence about net winners
The expected climate gains are of various natures; our purpose in this subsection is to
introduce a few indicative data. According to the IPCC, although ‘negative impacts of
climate change on crop yields have been more common than positive impacts (high
confidence)’ (2014: SPM 1.3.2) ‘[t]here is also high confidence that warming has
benefitted crop production in some high-latitude regions, such as northeast China
or the UK’ (also cf. Jaggard et al. 2007; Tchebakova et al. 2011; Gregory and
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Marshall 2012). Similarly, Arctic economies like Greenland’s stand to gain frommore
productive cod and mackerel resources in a warming world (Kjesbu et al. 2014;
Fossheim et al. 2015; Jansen et al. 2016). Broadly speaking, habitats towards the
poles become more accommodating for various species as the climate warms (of
course the converse is broadly true for habitats closer to the equator) (e.g.
Poloczanska et al. 2013).
But gains can be felt outside of agriculture and wildlife as well. Longer summers
boost the tourism industry in Arctic and polar regions (Buckley 2015). At the same
time, less rigorous winters provide ‘reduced requirement for indoor heating and a
reduction in cold weather related deaths’ in the UK (Vardoulakis and Heaviside
2012: 109). Finally, an overall more moderate climate may even increase
productivity in Russia and Canada (Burke et al. 2015; Dellink et al. 2019), as
well as facilitate oceanic trade due to an ice-free Northwest Passage between the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans (Stroeve et al. 2008). Generally speaking, Dellink
et al. (2019) find that of 25 regions modelled to 2060, two are predicted to be
net winners from climate change: Canada and Russia (with Japan having roughly
neutral expected net effects).12
2.2. The externalities argument
It is worth explicating that we are assuming the initial externalizing actions in question –
emitting GHGs – are permissible (i.e. neither required nor impermissible). If it were
straightforwardly morally wrong to perform the action associated with the
externalities in a given instance, it is plausible that society should provide no
incentive to perform the action. We are not committed to this claim, but we do
assume that the actions under consideration are permissible. What is morally
impermissible, we claim, is generating externalities while not internalizing them.
It is also important to note that we consider this question in isolation from
background injustices or antecedent distributions (i.e. we are considering changes
from the status quo, not evaluating absolute outcomes). We see two reasons for
this. First, we want to separate the descriptive statement that net winners (may)
exist from the evaluative questions about how they came to exist. There may
well be background injustices that led to these winners, but trying to untangle
these would overly complicate the analysis. We believe that introducing more
complexity can be done at a later stage, perhaps leading to principles with more
conditions or caveats. Second, on the reverse side of the previous point, we are
intending to determine what moral obligations may arise merely in light of
climate net winners (losers) or, more generally, in light of different distributions
of positive (negative) externalities. By focusing directly on one morally
interesting phenomenon, we believe we can understand it more clearly.
12However, at smaller scales, such as sectoral or subnational, there would likely be other net winners, as
Dellink et al. (2019) also discuss: net winners may be in other countries with similar climate conditions, but
these are hidden in larger regional groups; for instance the Other OECD EU region covers both
Scandinavian and Mediterranean countries. Minor benefits from climate change may also arise in other
regions, like agriculture in Chile (where positive impacts on fruit and vegetables outweigh negative
impacts on wheat).
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This is just to say that we are assuming that there is a special morally interesting
question with respect to these net winners and we want to examine what the answer
to such a question would be.
The motivation for our answer comes from two intuitions. The first is the
intuition that those who do not face all the effects of their actions will, insofar
as they are responsive to incentives, fail to act in ways that are best for society.
The second is the intuition that, in remedying actions which generate
externalities there should be transfers that, to the greatest practical extent
possible, correct the incentives with respect to these externalities. In the long-
term, these incentives will encourage better decision-making. Our view is that
these straightforward intuitions have surprisingly broad implications.
The justification for the first intuition comes from the study of externalities. If
there are costs (negative externalities) or benefits (positive externalities) which
accrue without being accounted for (internalized) in the agent’s decision-making,
the agent will fail to act in ways that overall best benefit society. In the negative
externality case, this is because there will be extra harms that are not counted
and make the action less choiceworthy than the agent takes it to be; in the
positive externality case, this is because there will be extra benefits that are not
counted and make the action more choiceworthy than the agent takes it to be.
This leads to the second intuition. In order to address these externalities, we want
there to be transfers that correct these incentives going forward. In some ways, this is a
familiar claim; in the climate ethics literature, PPP theorists defend the claim that
emitters should compensate those harmed by their emissions. However, we think
this claim should be justified on the basis of the desirability of internalizing the
externality. Doing so suggests that PPP is actually part of a broader project. If this is
right, for any given externality, the best way to make it incentive-compatible is to
introduce incentives with the same valence as the type of externality; if causing
negative externalities, one should pay and, if causing positive externalities, one
should be rewarded. At a first approximation, these should scale with the size of the
negative and positive externality generated. The harms and benefits from these
externalities are, we will argue in section 3, unearned but caused by the agent who
is externalizing them.13
One of our key contributions follows from these intuitions. If (at least some) of
those affected by positive externalities do not deserve those gains, then it is
appropriate to use those resources to reward anyone who generates those
positive externalities. They were lucky to receive them, but society would benefit
more if the resources were used to align incentives in such a way that those who
generate positive externalities gain from doing so, exactly in parallel to the claim
that society would benefit if those who generate negative externalities paid for
doing so. It is worth emphasizing that these intuitions may well be driven by
luck egalitarian considerations (or at least luck-sensitive distributional ethics –
we are not committed here to egalitarianism as the shape or pattern of justice).
We are not trying to punish – in the moral sense of the word – those who
13There is an important caveat to this claim. One of our contributions is suggesting that, some who
benefit from positive externalities do earn their positive externalities, due to active strategies that take
advantage of these externalities and contributing to overall social benefit, cf. section 3.
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generate the negative externality; nor are we trying to punish anyone who gains
from a positive externality. Instead, the idea is to align incentives in general so
that, over the long term, society overall benefits from it being more expensive to
generate negative externalities and more valuable to generate positive externalities.
A first reason for accepting our claims over, say, BPP is that an account that
assesses gains and losses symmetrically has virtues in terms of simplicity and
broader applicability. A theory that rewards positive externalities while
penalizing negative externalities is conceptually simpler than one that assesses
them asymmetrically. Indeed, the same logic operates throughout: a net winner
is simply one that experiences a net ‘negative loss’. The corresponding transfers
are the same as for a net loser (i.e. they occur between emitters and the affected)
but in reverse.14 Also, the concept has greater applicability because it applies to
the broader class of cases with mixed externalities. For instance, it can handle
cases where the negative externalities are smaller than the positive externalities
or, at the limit, where one type of externality is absent. Another way of framing
this advantage over alternatives is that thinking of having both transfers for this
path via the emitters is didactic, in the sense that it draws attention to the
conjunction of two externalities.
Second, from a social point of view, we should reward those who generate positive
externalities in line with their contributions to society. Many gains to society, such as
knowledge and innovation, are not sufficiently rewarded, which sends the wrong
signals about how we want society to develop. In particular, there are familiar
theoretical reasons to expect under-provision of public goods and over-provision
of public bads. This fits into a broader background picture of internalizing all
externalities, even in a case like climate change, where the (small) positive
externalities are coupled with (far larger) negative externalities.15 Systematically
internalizing both positive and negative externalities is of value. Also, we think
that these externalities should be addressed through transfers that are directed
towards the agents who created the externalities, in order for the resources to be
used to generate those incentives. It is easy for intuitions about the very sizeable
negative externalities of climate change to dominate our judgment to the point
where we neglect the positive externalities. However, addressing only the negative
externalities does not suffice to address the whole picture.
For many utilitarians, efficient incentivization of externalities (i.e. encouraging
positive externalities and disincentivizing negative externalities) is morally
justifiable in and of itself; we want our policies to lead people to be motivated to
act prosocially. A secondary reason to internalize externalities is that it leads
people to more explicitly recognize and weigh costs and benefits that are easily
ignored when externalized. However, our account goes beyond merely advocating
the theoretically appropriate internalization of externalities to arguments regarding
the direction of these transfers. The common intuition that you should clean up
14In cases with mixed externalities, any transfers which effectively run from the net winners to the net
losers via the emitters are epiphenomenal; they arise from the more fundamental points that there are
transfers from two different types of externalities.
15Furthermore, if considering which externalities to prioritize in policymaking, there is a principled
reason to consider climate externalities before other externalities: they may be the largest (Stern 2008).
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your own messes can be cashed out as introducing directed transfers. We believe that
such transfers apply also in the case of positive externalities. This contrasts with a
standard economic position, whereby the revenues from a Pigouvian tax need not
be used to address the source of externalities, but instead should be used for
whatever is most socially beneficial.
One objection to our account is that the emitters may no longer exist at the time
of reparation. This is often a way of motivating BPP. However, we believe that we
can meaningfully think of collectives like countries and firms as being the subject of
significant responsibilities and continuity. First of all, appealing to countries is
plausible because a significant amount of emissions can be traced back to
countries (Moss and Kath 2019); indeed, significant proportions can be traced
back even to individual firms (Heede 2014; Frumhoff et al. 2015; Shue 2017).
Second, appealing to countries is also how international negotiations are
structured, and we think that this has significant practical importance. Finally,
we think that common sense takes groups of people to be subject to obligations
and debts to society. Ultimately, the objection may also be moot because the set
of cases we outline below can fully handle situations where emitters no longer exist.
Having laid out the guiding intuitions, we can now turn to more specific questions.
3. Should net winners be left to enjoy their gains?
In this section, we argue that there is a moral difference between passive and active
net winners on both theoretical and practical grounds. We show that the difference
justifies the claim that there should be transfers from passive net winners but not
from active net winners. In other words, we think the former should not be allowed
to enjoy their gains, whereas the latter should.
Why might one think that there is a moral difference such that the passive gains
should or morally could be subject to transfers? We make two arguments. The first is
that passive winners should transfer their gains because they did not earn or deserve
them on the basis of active policies (subsection 3.1). The second is that, as a practical
matter, to keep the incentives for active policies in response to climate change –
while being unconcerned about incentives for passive winnings – we can justify
retaining the former profits while distributing the others (subsection 3.2).
3.1. Active policies and desert
Adaptation to climate change is an important pillar of climate policy, and it can involve
changing practices, such as agricultural activities at the farm level or at the national
scale. A first argument for the claim that there is a moral difference between active
and passive net winners is that the active net winners have (actively) changed their
relevant practices in order to benefit from climate change. This type of argument
appeals to a certain type of libertarian or classically liberal political theory. In that
respect, we believe that it results from one of the most prima facie unfriendly
background positions to the significant redistribution we advocate.
By engaging in active measures, this argument goes, active winners have earned
or deserve those gains. In contrast, the passive winners have not responded to
climate change, and therefore have no desert basis for their winnings. This is
endorsed in ‘desert-based justice’, a theory whereby agents deserve rewards
10 Kian Mintz-Woo and Justin Leroux
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(‘deserts’) given ‘desert bases’ that are appropriately both the agents’ responsibility
and relevant to the reward (Olsaretti 2008; Brouwer and Mulligan 2019). In this
context, the agents are the active net winners, their deserts are their climate
gains and the desert basis is their active policies taking advantage of changing
climatic conditions. In contrast, it looks like passive net winners do not have
any desert basis for their climate enhanced gains.16
The distinction is thus between those who actively respond to climate change and
those who do not – and therefore would act the same in the counterfactual world
without climate change. The theory provides a principled way of drawing the moral
difference between these active and passive categories. The active net winners could
be responding to climate change directly, by entering markets where positive climate
externalities apply, or indirectly, by entering markets to meet demand for climate-
related products or services where negative climate externalities threaten. In
contrast, passive net winners would simply produce more or sell their products
at higher prices due to shifts in market conditions for their existing products.
In practice, one may find it difficult to disentangle passive gains and those resulting
from an active change in the course of action, but morally there is a significant difference
and conceptually there is a clear distinction. As a suggestion of how one could
operationalize this distinction, we propose three categories of actions that businesses
could take to gain from climate change: (i) changes in prices and quantities supplied
in response to demand or supply shifts; (ii) entering markets that have become
profitable as market conditions evolve due to a changing climate; and (iii) developing
innovative products to adapt to or mitigate climate change. Our opinion is that a
category (i) change is a much less meaningful change in course of action than the
other two: one could say it is a ‘quantitative’ change, as opposed to the other two,
which can be deemed ‘qualitative’ in nature. Also, it is noteworthy that (ii) and (iii)
do not require one’s prior activity to be affected by climate change, so that these
actions differ more explicitly from the status quo. Finally, setting the threshold for
what is active between (i) and (ii) has the added advantage of greater observability.
In summary, on conventional versions of desert theories of justice, the benefits
which accrue to those who (primarily) take active measures are more plausibly
earned than those who (primarily) benefit passively (Olsaretti 2008). However,
not only can we justify the active/passive distinction theoretically, we can also
justify it by appealing to incentives.
3.2. Incentives
As one intention of this proposal is to align incentives, one argument for
distinguishing between the active and passive beneficiaries of climate change is
16One could argue that the difference between active and passive winners could simply be that active
winners are better informed and, thus, better able to respond to the changing climate. We thank Marc
Fleurbaey for this observation. There are at least two ways to counter this objection. The libertarian
answer retorts that individuals are responsible for their information-gathering as much as they are for
their actions (for instance, their credence is equally likely that the action or gathering information will
make a moral difference, cf. Mintz-Woo 2017). A more nuanced answer consists in pointing out the
qualitative differences in the responses to climate change one might take, as we do by singling out
behaviours (i)–(iii) below.
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motivated by incentives that we believe has been missed by standard BPP theorists.
BPP, when not including our distinction between active and passive beneficiaries,
would have massively counterproductive implications if adopted as policy. It is not a
sensible policy to undermine incentives for developing products and services which
address climate problems. Yet this is precisely what the standard BPP view would
entail: it would require the corresponding gains to be disgorged to those harmed by
climate change. As climate change advances, we will need more solutions for climate
adaptation, not fewer.
As an example, consider the developer of an innovative solution to help
populations better cope with the increase in global temperature. To allay
distributional concerns, suppose that this innovation is cheap and effective, so
that many can have access to it, regardless of wealth. Clearly, the developer of
this climate solution benefits from the new climate. Also, we surmise that this is
a clear case of an ‘active’ net winner, since they are responding to the climate
demand. Nevertheless, the standard BPP view would require the disgorgement of
all corresponding profits. This would eliminate any incentive to develop such
solutions. By contrast, our account would preserve such incentives.
Here we see an important difference between passive and active winners from
climate change. The behaviour of passive winners, whether via positive or
negative externalities, does not need to be incentivized since, by definition, they
would pursue the same policies regardless of climate change. So we would expect
that they would be profitable (or at least would take themselves to be) regardless
of climate change and regardless of the extra demand that accrues because of
climate change. In contrast, the actions taken by active winners do need to be
incentivized because, otherwise, they would not pursue the active policies that
would be involved in, inter alia, responding to shifts in demand or production
driven by climate change.17
The upshot of the discussion in these subsections is that there are two arguments
for the claim that passive net winners, unlike active net winners, owe something to
someone. The first depends on a certain type of desert-based theory; the second
appeals to the incentives involved in rejecting our distinction. Note that we need
not take a stand on the extent of the obligation, just that it arises in light of
their status as passive net winners and that it has a relationship to the amount
of their net winnings. The next question is where the gains that we argue are
subject to permissible redistribution should be directed.
4. To whom are net winners indebted?
In the previous section, we argued for our first claim: climate net winners are not
entitled to keep their passive gains. In this section, we argue for our second claim:
that climate winners owe their passive gains to the emitters, not to the climate
losers directly.
17Note that this proposal is consistent with the claim that active climate winners might lose the gains
associated with their active status either (i) after some time or (ii) in some decreasing manner over
time. Our claims just require that this differential incentive is needed for the initial actions in response
to climate change.
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Our main claim is that, whenever possible, emitters should fully compensate the harm
their emissions cause and, provided they do so, should be rewarded for the positive effects
their emissions generate – that is, the PPTR Principle. This claim is chiefly motivated by
economic efficiency, which is brought about when all actors internalize all externalities
attached to their activities.18 Climate change is thus a special case of a broader set of
market failures, albeit perhaps the largest one (Stern 2008).
When this ideal case cannot be achieved, we appeal to a concept we call a
hierarchy of claims. This hierarchy holds that there is priority in fully redressing
the losses of the harmed, which is the responsibility of emitters; another –
though secondary – obligation is for net winners to transfer their passive gains
to emitters. In fact, this latter obligation only applies should emitters abide by
their duty to compensate the harmed.
Our position is an intermediate one between, on the one hand, the stance that
economic efficiency should rule above all, leading to fully symmetric treatment of
gains and losses and, on the other hand, the commonly held view that punishes
emitters by insisting that they compensate the harmed yet denies them the
rewards for the social benefits their emissions generate. As mentioned, our
position leads to the internalization of all externalities by emitters in the ideal
case – but not in some non-ideal cases, as we will show – but has the palatable
feature of recommending compensating the harmed first and foremost, thus
generating more intuitive outcomes than a purely symmetric treatment.
In practice, however, the ideal situation of solvent and willing emitters may
actually be an uncommon case.19 Of course, we believe that our proposal should
be legislated such that any ‘unwillingness’ is subject to legal or criminal redress.
However, it is worth distinguishing between three morally relevant non-ideal
cases, depending on whether emitters are insolvent, unwilling to compensate
climate harm, or no longer in existence, in reverse order:
1. Emitters no longer exist.
2. Emitters are present but unwilling to fully compensate the negative
externality.
3. Emitters are present but unable to fully compensate the negative externality.
The difference with Case 2 is motivated by the fact that emitters are making
every effort to repair the harm they have caused.20
In none of the three cases are climate victims fully compensated by emitters.
Therefore, one must ask whether the remaining transfers involving emitters in the
ideal case – the transfers from climate winners to emitters – should still be upheld.
Clearly, in Case 1, whether winners should transfer gains to emitters is a moot
point: there are no emitters to reward. However, this does not mean that climate
winners are entitled to keep their gains. In fact, we argue the opposite. The mere
18Note that focusing on climate harm alone, by arguing against transfers from winners to emitters, would
warp incentives and induce too little pollution compared with the efficient outcome.
19We thank two anonymous reviewers for stressing this point.
20Although distinguishing between Case 2 and Case 3 may be difficult in practice, the distinction is
morally relevant.
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disappearance of the emitters does not suddenly make the winners’ (passive) gains
legitimate. It simply means that the primary recipients of those transferred gains are
no longer around. Yet, to the extent that there is uncompensated harm, we argue
that the climate losers are natural (‘secondary’) recipients of the winners’ gains.
Therefore, in the absence of emitters, we claim that passive climate winners
should transfer their gains to the harmed.21
In Case 2, where emitters are present but unwilling to fully compensate the
harmed, we argue that the unwillingness of emitters to take part in the
compensation scheme excludes them from receiving any transfers from climate
winners. Indeed, it is our view that, by not compensating the harmed, the
emitters have implicitly forfeited their part in the scheme. We are then back to
Case 1 as far as transfers are concerned: passive winners should transfer their
climate gains to the harmed.
Notice that a view focused purely on incentives, with no consideration of
corrective justice, would yield different recommendations in Case 1 and in Case
2. From an ex post viewpoint, if emitters refuse to obey the rules of the transfer
scheme – Case 2 – the incentives argument for transfers to and from the
emitters vanishes. Hence, a purely incentives-focused view would simply be
silent in Case 2, effectively recommending that net winners keep their gains.
Moreover, from an ex ante viewpoint, promising rewards to emitters who
anticipate neglecting their duty to compensate the harmed would lead to warped
incentives. This is because there are two externalities of opposite sign. Indeed,
compared with a situation where both externalities are internalized, the scenario
with no internalization may lead to emissions levels that are closer to the
optimal ones than by internalizing only gains (as would be the case if, as in
Case 2, emitters were still eligible for transfers from net winners). We illustrate
this point with Figure 1, where the magnitude of the negative externality is
much larger than that of the positive externality, as is the case for climate
change. The only situation where this incentives argument does not hold is
when the positive externality significantly outweighs the negative externality.
There, rewarding only the positive externality yields better incentives than the
scenario with no internalization (Figure 2). However, as far as we know, this
situation does not arise in the case of climate change.
21It should be noted that climate winners are never liable for more than their passive climate gains. We
assume that whatever wealth they may have outside of those climate gains has been acquired legitimately.
Should it not be the case, any illegitimate earnings should be treated independently from the climate
problem and are therefore beyond the scope of this article. Whether climate winners are liable for more
than climate harm appeals to different principles. Should the winners’ net climate gains exceed the
harm to victims, what should happen to the surplus depends on how one weighs the institution of
private property over social welfare. Indeed, a potential ‘tertiary’ recipient of transfers from climate
winners could be society as a whole. If transferring the surplus – climate gains, net of compensatory
transfers to the harmed – to society would yield huge social benefits, there is a case for requiring
passive climate winners to transfer more of their gains, this time to society. If not, the social benefits
may not be worth violating private property. In practice, determining whether such transfers are
justified may be challenging (not least because of the regulatory uncertainty they could generate), but
our arguments suggest that such transfers could be appropriate under some circumstances. Allowing
this provision, we will assume that the size of the surplus is generally so small – if at all positive – that
climate winners would be allowed to retain it.
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Finally, turning to Case 3, the situation only differs from the ideal case in that
emitters do not have deep enough pockets to shoulder the necessary compensation
to the harmed. Compensating the harmed requires additional funds, such as those
that the emitters can obtain from the passive winners. Passive winners would still
owe their gains to emitters. In fact, a transfer from winners to emitters would help
Figure 1. When the negative externality dominates the positive one, in the sense of E	 being to the left of
E, internalizing only gains leads to a further departure from the efficient emissions level: E
0
lies farther to
the right of E	 than E.
Figure 2. When the positive externality is overwhelmingly large, the situation where only the positive
externality is internalized incentivizes an emissions level (corresponding to point E
0
) that is closer to effi-
cient one, at E	, than the business-as-usual scenario, at E.
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the latter to compensate the harmed.22 Equivalently, passive winners could transfer
their gains to the harmed, in part or in full, up to the point where they are made
whole. Whatever surplus remains, if any, should be transferred from passive
winners to emitters.
This last case is related to the concept of ‘joint and several liability’ in tort law.23
According to this legal practice, a plaintiff can claim compensation for the full
amount of an injury to any one of multiple tortfeasors. The tortfeasors who have
paid the compensation may then be able to obtain contribution (i.e. partial
reimbursement) from the remaining tortfeasors, according to their relative
responsibility in the injury.
As was pointed out byWright (1988), a corrective justice view of tort law requires
that the cost of compensation is apportioned among the tortfeasors based on their
comparative responsibility. However, redressing the harm of the injured plaintiff
takes priority over realizing the appropriate transfers between other parties.
Although net winners are by no means ‘tortfeasors’, this line of argument is
similar in spirit to our notion of ‘hierarchy of claims’:
The caveat is critical. Under corrective justice theory, the tortiously injured
plaintiff’s claim against tortfeasors for full compensation has priority over
the tortfeasor’s claims against one another for apportionment of the cost of
compensating the plaintiff. (Wright 1988: 1183)
A notable feature of joint and several liability is that the injured party is
compensated directly by some tortfeasors, but indirectly compensated by others.
The latter are those who partially reimburse the ones that have initially
compensated the injured party for the full amount of the injury. This ‘indirect
path’ occurs in our proposal also, whereby emitters fully compensate climate
harm before receiving contribution from climate winners. Wright forcefully
defends joint and several liability as opposed to joint and proportional liability –
where each tortfeasor is liable directly to the injured party, and only so, for
partial compensation – arguing that having to locate and sue a single tortfeasor
increases the likelihood that the injured party will be compensated.
5. Policy implications
Our proposal could be implemented in various ways. Ideally, the emitters of the
world would compensate the harm caused to the climate victims of the world,
and passive climate winners would compensate emitters regardless of national
borders. If that is impossible, because emitters are unwilling or unable to
compensate the harmed, or altogether absent, the various cases outlined above
would apply. But the absence of a supranational power makes it doubtful
22Note that if the combined gains to emitters and climate winners are not enough to compensate the
harmed, then it means that the corresponding emissions were socially harmful, in the sense of
generating a net loss to society considered as whole.
23We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to the relevance of the concepts of tort law
in this section.
16 Kian Mintz-Woo and Justin Leroux
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267120000449
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University College Cork, on 23 Feb 2021 at 09:19:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
whether we could achieve these transfers at a disaggregated level. It is therefore
prudent to consider a smaller scale at which to implement the proposal.
Up until now, we have talked about emitters, the harmed, and winners in a
general manner. For purposes of implementation, and for the purposes of
illustration, we consider two scales at which to apply the principle: between
sectors of a national economy (subsection 5.1), and between states or provinces
within a federal nation (subsection 5.2). For concreteness, we discuss Canada as
a potential site of implementation. Canada has several characteristics which
make it an interesting case: positively, it may be a politically palatable location
for such policy experiments; negatively, it may be a net winner from climate
change so restricting our scope to this particular country would be non-
representative for world policy. A side effect of Canada being a net winner
would be that there would be a built-in constituency for such a policy; emitters
could benefit from a Canada-only version of this policy.
5.1. Sectors of the economy
Asmentioned in section 2, the likely climate winners can be most easily identified by
sectors of activity within a population: for instance, evidence suggests the
agricultural and tourism sectors in northern countries stand to gain from longer
warm seasons. It therefore seems natural to identify those sectors that would
have the duty to reward emitters.
A climate policy based on the concept of hierarchy of claims would require revenues
from a carbon tax, say, to be aimed first and foremost at compensating the victims.24
Should these revenues not suffice to make victims whole, a supplementary tax, such as a
corporate tax on those winning sectors, could be levied to further compensate climate
victims.25 Should revenues from the carbon tax prove sufficient, those of the
supplementary corporate tax would accrue to the emitters.
From a practical standpoint, one can envision ways to make these future outlays
relatively predictable despite the uncertain nature of the future climate. One such
possibility would be to compute climate gains based on climate trends (which can be
predicted with reasonable accuracy in the short-to-medium run) rather than on
given realizations (which cannot). Such trends are made available – although
they could still be refined and, ideally, converted to monetary terms – by
reputable institutions like the IPCC.
Moreover, from an efficiency standpoint, focusing on climate trends does not
weaken incentives for emitters because efficiency requires them to consider the
expected marginal harm of their emissions in their decision to emit.
Furthermore, such an approach would have the added benefit of encouraging
information gathering about the realized impacts of climate change.26
24Whether the policy instrument is a carbon tax or something else is of little import. What matters is that
it is a revenue-generating instrument that applies specifically to emitters. Carbon taxes can be defended
normatively from common objections (Mintz-Woo et al. 2020; Mintz-Woo 2021).
25To be explicit, the supplemental tax would be a tax on profits, not on emissions.
26These points are discussed in sections 4 and 5 of Billette de Villemeur and Leroux (2019), along with
discussions of possible institutional design.
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Although much easier to implement than an international agreement, a within-
country sectoral approach would suffer from the fact that we are using a within-
country instrument to try to address a global problem. As a result, transfers would
only apply to the externalities within a single country or jurisdiction. If the mix of
externalities within that country were non-representative, this policy could
generate counterintuitive results. For instance, in a high-emitting country with
disproportionately large positive externalities, this can lead to cases where transfers
add up to a net reward to its fossil fuel industry, since within the country there
are greater positive externalities than negative externalities (although, globally, the
opposite is the case). Ideally, we would ultimately want the emitters of that
country and, if need be, its winning sectors to compensate the harmed in other
countries, addressing all the externalities as opposed to this artificial territorial
limitation. The situation depicted is not a mere thought experiment. A country
like Canada, with high emissions per capita and relatively low negative
externalities from the changing climate – and, arguably, net winning sectors –
would most likely see its own harm covered by a relatively low carbon tax,
meaning that Canadian emitters would have to internalize a relatively small
fraction of the negative externalities they cause worldwide, since the policy would
consider only domestic externalities whereas the bulk of negative externalities are
global. These emitters would even be entitled to the gains of Canadian (passive)
climate winners. However, note that this counterintuitive case arises neither from
the concept of hierarchy of claims itself, nor from the structure of the policy, but
from the fact that we have regionally constrained the policy’s application whereas
the externalities are global.27 This is why we turn next to federalism, which we
believe can yield useful insights towards global policy.
5.2. Provinces of a federal nation
At the regional (e.g. state or provincial) level, one would first need to identify
whether some regions are indeed net climate winners. This is less likely than at
the sectoral level discussed above, but could happen if some regions were
especially known for, say, their large agricultural sectors (e.g. the Canadian
province Saskatchewan).
There is currently much debate about how revenue from carbon pricing should
be recycled, notably in Canada.28 All the options put forth assume that revenues
would remain within the provinces – albeit entirely for political reasons
(Canada’s Ecofiscal Commission 2016). In other words, transfers between
provinces would be a significant departure from the current political debate.
Because these transfers would account for compensation for negative
externalities, the policy would be a sort of ‘interprovincial climate liability’.29
27Discussion of independent moral considerations for making the social cost of carbon global as opposed
to national are discussed by Mintz-Woo (2018).
28There is broad agreement that optimal policy should include revenue recycling, however (Klenert et al.
2018).
29Billette de Villemeur and Leroux (2019) introduce and analyse the features of climate liabilities as an
economic instrument.
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Because they are composed of regional governments, federal nations provide a
small-scale laboratory of how international policies might play out. The two
major differences are, of course, (1) that there is no supranational government
to impose legislation on countries, whereas a federal government has substantial
power over provinces or states; and (2) buy-in could be affected by the
nationally specific mix of externalities (as pointed out in the previous
subsection). Since a federal government has substantial power, what cannot work
under federalism has little chance of being implemented at the international
level. On the other hand, successes encountered with a federal nation may
provide useful hints for what is possible on the international stage. Our view is
that testing or implementing these policy proposals at regional scales is
invaluable for determining their large-scale viability.
6. Conclusion
The climate ethics literature has broadly grappled with the polluter pays, beneficiary
pays and ability to pay principles. While climate change is often thought of as a
single net externality, it is more rarely considered as a constellation of
externalities, some smaller and some larger, some positive and some negative,
externalities which may have different types of justice associated with them.
More specifically, we are unaware of cases where positive climate externalities
are systematically discussed. We think that the type of externality matters and,
in cases where there are a mix of positive and negative externalities, both the
polluter and the beneficiary should pay, but to different degrees and to different
subjects, resulting in the polluter pays, then receives (PPTR) principle. The
concept of hierarchy of claims offers a novel way forward by building upon the
PPP while incorporating aspects of BPP as well as introducing elements beyond
any of these three dominant principles to produce the PPTR Principle. Because
of this, the PPTR Principle is not reducible to any combination of the three
principles. Furthermore, PPTR does not pertain only to the climate issue; these
claims potentially apply to any setting with mixed externalities (and of course,
more trivially to cases where the externalities are purely negative or positive).
If only for strategic reasons, a comprehensive picture of climate change requires
acknowledging the fact that positive externalities may exist. Indeed, focusing solely
on negative externalities gives fodder to climate sceptics of a certain stripe, who can
reinterpret this as a (simple to disprove) general statement that all climate
externalities are negative. By accounting fully for the existence of positive
externalities, one avoids this weak starting position.
We take there to be a strong case for obligations to emitters from passive net
winners. The possibly counterintuitive nature of this claim may be a result of a
type of priority with respect to negative externalities and the harms done by
emitting to the climate net losers. In fact, it is the very foundation of our
concept of hierarchy of claims. Although we agree with this priority, we are
open to a simpler account which takes both treatment and assessment
symmetrically. Regardless, we also believe that theories of climate justice should
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be able to handle further complexity, one facet of which we have grappled with in
this paper.
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